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Foreword
During 1980 Science, the weekly journal of the American Association
for the Advancement of Science, will celebrate its centennial by publishing
a Centennial Issue containing, in addition to five articles on the history
of science, articles on the current state and future prospects in astronomy,
the behavioral and social sciences, biology, chemistry, the earth and
planetary sciences, mathematics, physics, medicine, engineering, industrial
research, operations research and systems analysis, world population, food
and nutrition, energy, environment, rural development, communications, and
science and technology in the developing countries.
Following an invitation from Philip H. Abelson, Editor, I prepared the
draft of an article on operations research and systems analysis, which was
circulated to some 30 leaders in these fields in the United States and at
IIASA. The present version took account of many of the comments and sug-
gestions that these persons were kind enough to forward to me.
My instructions were primarily to emphasize key recent developments
as they may affect the future; however, since this is the first such piece
to appear in a journal of so wide and varied a readership, I adopted the
additional goal of introducing the general reader with some scientific
interests to the subject and of showing him how it grew out of the older
sciences, and how it is a natural expression of scientific growth in our
time.
Since space was severely limited, this complex of goals made it
necessary to leave almost everything of interest to the OR/SA professional
out, particularly since I felt that some well chosen examples would say
more to the intended audience than a series of generalities. This fact
made the choice of what to include difficult. No doubt another author
would have chosen differently, as the comments from my many professional
colleagues indicated. However, choices had to be made within space limi-
tations, and they were made on the basis of what seemed most important to
me and what would fit into a reasonably brief discussion.
In preparing this paper I had two hopes: that it would be an inter-
esting and useful introduction to many persons who may have wondered what
operations research and systems analysis are, and that it would suggest
some useful points of view to practicing analysts in these fields.
February 18, 1980
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Hugh J. Miser

Suunnary
The science of man/machine operating systems, which includes operations
research and systems analysis, has achieved a substantial body of theory and
application over the last forty years. Its current strength prompts it to
attack difficult large-scale problems, in spite of their manifest difficulties,
while challenging the other relevant sciences to unite, not only with each
other and operations and systems research, but also with society, to deal with
some of the most widespread and important problems of our time.
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Operations research, unlike most sciences, is able to point to a well
defined combination of circumstances and events that not only began its
activities as a coherent development but also caused its name to be coined.
After Hitler rose to power in Germany, England sought to prepare a suitable
defense against possible air attack, with the result that, by late 1937, the
key elements of an effective defense had been devised: radar and the
Hurricane fighter plane. But combining them into an effective system could
not be left to improvisation, as the disappointing results of an air exercise
showed in July 1938. Consequently, A. P. Rowe, then leader of the radar
development work on England's east coast, proposed that research into the
operational--as opposed to the purely technical--aspects of the radar/fighter
system be undertaken, and the term "operational research" was coined to
describe the work (1).
This new kind of research, conducted in close cooperation with the
officers and men of the Royal Air Force, led directly to substantial improve-
ments in England's air defense system, which was given its most decisive
test in the Battle of Britain during August and September of 1940.
The success of this partnership between scientists and operating forces
prompted the spread of operational research to other British commands and
services. When the United States entered the war, this British precedent
was pursued by US military commanders, with the result that, by late 1942,
groups of scientists were undertaking similar work for both the US Navy
and Army Air Corps. However, the name had been-Americanized to "operations
research."
By the end of the war, England, Canada, and the United States had
employed perhaps as many as 700 scientists in work loosely described by
these terms (2).
Some of the work that these scientists did merely exploited the technical
backgrounds that they brought to their wartime tasks. However, there was
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also the important novelty that they had studied and evaluated the results
of tactical operations, devised tactical innovations and predicted their
possible consequences, and, when the innovations were actually used, com-
pared expected results with those actually achieved. And this knowledge
had often become the basis for helping with tactical planning, and even,
during the later stages of the war, for contributing important knowledge
to strategic choices.
History shows that operations research workers made important contri-
butions to the war efforts of their countries. However, another outcome of
this work was also important: Many of these scientists saw in their wartime
scientific achievements the germ of a new ｳ｣ｾ･ｮ｣･ of operating man/machine
systems that could be developed for peacetime activities and applied to
their problems.
The Science of Operations Research
It is clear that many of these pioneers of operations research saw
their work as being scientific; for example, as early as 1941 P. M. S.
Blackett (a physicist who later won a Nobel prize for his work on cosmic
rays), in a memorandum on "Scientists at the Operational Level," emphasized
that the work was "scientific analysis of operations" and should be staffed
and carried out in the spirit of science (3). This memorandum had consid-
erable influence on both sides of the Atlantic.
Many of the scientists who became involved with this wartime work were
surprised to find that there were identifiable stabilities in situations that
they had always considered to be totally formless. For example, consider
the outcomes of air combat. While a commander can control his own tactics,
he cannot control those of his enemy, and the surrounding weather conditions
also introduce an element of uncertainty. Nevertheless, it was often possible
to predict the outcomes with considerable accuracy (4).
The sense of wonder that such systems of men and machines operating
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in conflict in a natural environment could exhibit aspects of regularity
was expressed by two of the most notable US operations research pioneers,
Philip M. Morse (a physicist from Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
and Geotge E. Kimball (a chemist from Columbia University), when they wrote
in 1946 that "large bodies of men and equipment carrying out complex operations
behave in an astonishingly regular manner, so that one can predict the outcome of
such operations to a degree not foreseen by most natural scientists" (5).
Too, the World War II experiences had exhibited the classic cycle of
the method of science (6): The scientists had observed nature (albeit the
startlingly new phenomena of military operations), had built theories to
account for these observations, had used them to predict future outcomes,
and had tested these predictions against actual experience, with frequent
agreement. Indeed, many of them had experienced several connected and suc-
cessive cycles, from which had emerged fairly comprehensive theories with
accepted predictive value. Thus, the novelty of wartime operations research
did not lie in the method that was being used, but rather in the part of
"nature" to which it was applied: military operations.
The consequence was a natural one: Many scientists emerging from this
experience expected that it could be extended to a wide variety of civilian
peacetime operating systems.
By the end of the first decade after the war, examples had begun to
emerge to give substance to this expectation (7), and by now their number
and variety are very great (8).
In 1979 Eric Brodheim of The New York Blood Center and Gregory P.
Prastacos of the University of Pennsylvania reported a notable study of
blood distribution and utilization that exhibits key aspects of such
work (9). The national problem they were responding to is this:
Each year over two million hospitalized Americans depend
upon the timely availability of the right type of blood products
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at 6,000 hospital blood banks (RBBs) in the United States. If the
right blood products are not available at the RBB when required,
then medical complications or postponements of elective surgery
can result, which translate to extra days of hospitalization and
expense. On the other hand, since most blood products may only be
administered to a patient of the same blood type within 21 days of
collection, overstocking at HBBs leads to low utilization, which
increases costs and is wasteful of the scarce blood resource.
Or, as Johanna Pindyck, Director of the Greater New York Blood Program (the
largest in the world), puts it, "We face the major problem of how to maxi-
mize the availability of blood to each of • • • 262 hospitals • while
effectively discharging our implicit covenant to our donors to see that
their gift is efficiently utilized."
Since there are approximately 200 Regional Blood Centers (RBCs) in the
United States, Brodheim and Prastacos viewed the problem from the RBC point
of view, as well as from that of the HBB:
Most blood products in the United States are derived from whole
blood that is collected by an RBC in units of one pint from volunteer
donors. After laboratory processing and testing, whole blood and blood
products derived from whole blood are distributed to the HBBs, where
they are stored to be available for transfusion when requested.
The complexity of the blood inventory-management problem is due
primarily to the perishability of blood, the uncertainties involved
in its availability to the RBC, and the fluctuating demands and usages
at the HBBs. Too, there are large variations in the S1zes of the HBBs
to be supplied, in the relative occurrence of the different blood
groups, and in the mix of whole blood and blood products used at each
RBB. Finally, the performance of a regional (or hospital) blood-
management system can be evaluated in terms of multiple criteria
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(or objectives), some of which conflict (e.g., availability vs.
utilization of blood at an HBB), or involve costs that are difficult
to estimate (e.g., the cost of unavailability).
As a result of this complexity, regional blood management systems
have historically been decentralized and reactive in nature, charac-
terized by the HBBs placing daily orders to bring their inventory to
what each considered a safe value, and the RBC trying to fill these
orders, as they came, while keeping a necessary buffer in the stock.
This created a feeling of uncertainty, as a result of which HBBs have
generally tried to maintain high inventories of most of the 8 different
types of each of these products in order to provide high availability
to satisfy patient needs, and have accepted the low utilization
resulting from spoilage. Consequently, the national utilization
rate of whole blood and red blood cells prior to expiration was
estimated to be only 80 percent in 1974.
After becoming thoroughly familiar with the practical operations of the
Long Island blood distribution system, which was the test bed for their
analysis, Brodheim and Pra.stacos reasoned that three important management
concepts should be introduced·into the approach that they were exploring:
Instead of individual ordering from every HBB, a regional
management system has to be developed that will allocate most of
the available regional resources among the HBBs so that they are
utilized most efficiently. This calls for some form of centralized
decision making at the RBC, which will operate under objectives of
overall regional efficiency, as opposed to the existing mode of
decentralized decision making, operating under objectives of local
(i.e., HBB) efficiency.
Any regional strategy that allocates blood products to be
retained until transfused or outdated will result in low utilization,
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especially in the case of the small-usage HBBs which, 1n aggregate,
account for the largest part of overall blood usage. Consequently,
some form of blood "rotation" is required whereby freshly processed
blood is sent to an HBB, from which it may be returned, some time
later, for redistribution according to the regional strategy.
It is also desirable that a significant portion of the periodic
deliveries to the HBBs be preschedu1ed. This way the uncertainty of
supply faced by the HBBs is reduced, with a resulting improvement 1n
the planning of operations, and the utilization of their resources.
While a brief sketch can only suggest the depth and subtlety of the analysis,
it is nonetheless helpful in understanding the nature of the results.
The blood needs of an HBB can be expressed as the demand (that is, the
number of units required to be on hand for possible transfusion) and the usage,
(that is, the number of units actually transfused). On the other hand, from the
RBC point of view, the effectiveness of the supply management can be measured in
terms of two rates: the availability rate (that is, the fraction of days when
the inventory of a given blood type on hand is sufficient to meet the demand),
and the utilization rate (that is, the fraction of the supply that is trans-
fused). The first task of the analysts was therefore to devise a model that
translates demand and usage to availability and utilization rates as functions
of RBC blood-distribution policies and HBB blood-stocking policies.
Since the availability rate at an HBB depends only on the pattern of
demand and the inventory level, it could be explored on the basis of b100d-
bank data. The analysts found sufficient stability in the evidence to
establish the "universal" piecewise linear relation between inventory level
and mean daily demand, with the availability rate as a parameter, shown in
Figure 1. Tests showed that the ability of this model to predict was high.
The availability rates that HBB managers considered to be adequate ranged
usually from 85 to 95 percent.
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Figure 1. Inventory levels and mean daily demands for blood units for
given availability rates at hospital blood banks.
The utilization rate depends on the size and age ｭ ｾ ｸ of the blood supply
in an HBB, as well as the demand. The distribution strategy is also an impor-
tant issue. After consultations with the HBBs, and in agreement with the
management concepts outlined above, the following class of policies was chosen
for analysis. Each HBB receives periodic shipments at intervals between 1 and 4
days long (to be determined from the analysis, depending on the size of the HBB,
and other considerations). Each periodic shipment to the HBB includes a number
of fresh (or, long-dated: 1-2 day old) rotation units and a number of older (or,
stock-dated: 6-7 day old) retention units. The latter are retained until trans-
fused or discarded, but the rotation units that are in excess of a fixed desired
inventory level at the end of the period are returned to the RBC for redistribu-
tion. Modeling this situation called for a finite-state Markov chain analysis.
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Having derived these models to predict the HBB availability and
utilization rates for any policy implemented by the RBC, the analysts
examined the regional allocation problem, assuming that there were fixed
penalty costs associated with nonavailable and nonutilized units. They
found that the policy minimizing the total expected one-period cost was:
(1) first allocate all available retention units so as to
equalize the utilization rates at all HBBs;
(2) then allocate all available rotation units (which are
not subject to spoilage (while at the HBB) so as to equalize the
availability rates at all HBBs.
It was also shown that this policy is independent of unit penalty
costs, and that it maximizes both the availability and utilization of
blood in the region simultaneously. That is, any deviation from the
policy that would reduce utilization would also result in reduced
availability for the next period, and vice versa.
In addition. the analysts found that the short-term policy had the
same structural characteristics as the policy which was optimal over the
long run, and even that the utilization and availability rates calculated
for the short term corresponded very closely to the optimal values for the
long run. Thus, they could return to the result showing that the distribu-
tion policy listed above for the one-period case was optimal and establish
the principle that:
A distribution policy should seek to equalize utilization rates
and availability rates among the HBBs in the region. This is also a
policy that has the essential elements of "fairness" in spreading
equally the nonavailability and nonutilization risks amongst hospitals
regardless of their relative size, and is consequently a highly
defensible policy.
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Figure 2. Illustration of a planned regional blood flow.
With these results in hand, the analysts formulated the problem as a
mathematical program, which they used to determine the appropriate distri-
bution policy for the region (Figure 2 gives an example of such a policy) .
They then turned to the task of implementation 1n their test region,
the Long Island blood distribution system. This is an important story in
its own right, but too long to summarize here. It was carried out in a
sequence of planned steps, and was characterized by continuous interaction
with the medical and administrative personnel, design of the necessary
forms and procedures, educational sessions with the users, and development
of an automated computer-based information system. The results have been
gratifying: utilization and availability have improved significantly, wastage
has gone down by 80 percent, and delivery costs reduced by 64 percent.
The administrative system derived from these results (10), which has
been in operation on Long Island for three years, is being extended to the
rest of the Greater New York Blood Program, and is being considered for
introduction elsewhere in the United States and abroad.
This example exhibits the pattern familiar to the wartime operations
research analysts, and one that remains central to successful operations
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research work to this day: problem, observation, theory building (usually
called modeling today), problem solution based on calculations from the
theory, devising a system to be implemented, and testing it in actual
practice, the analysts keeping in close touch throughout with the situation
being studied and with the persons involved with it. To which should be
added two aspects that this brief example did not treat: implementation
brings new problems for analysis, and a changing underlying situation may
call for revisions in the basic research.
The Methods
Almost all of the work during the war borrowed methods and theories
from existing fie1ds--mathematica1 analysis, probability, statistics, and
the natural sciences--with only an occasional new model being assembled
from these elements to represent the new aspects of nature that the analysts
were exploring. The most notable exception was a theory of search developed
as part of the work for the US Navy (11).
The early post-war work followed the same pattern. Thus, it was hardly
surprising that Philip M. Morse, in retiring from the office of the first
President of the Operations Research Society of America in 1953, said that "one
of our major tasks ••• is to develop analytic techniques and to broaden
their range of application" (12), a feeling that was widely shared at the time.
The operations research community's response to this challenge was remark-
able for its depth, comprehensiveness, and fecundity. The flow of theoretical
developments quickly became a flood that continues unabated to this day. Thus,
in modest space one can only mention important currents, relying on the reader
to consult the excellent new Handbook of Operations Research (13) for further
elucidation and guides to important literature. The result is that today's
operations research worker has a wide and varied spectrum of models to work with.
Some theories that already existed were extended significantly: the
theory of stochastic processes represented many systems of interest to
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operations research workers, who contributed to its development; the related
theory of queues, entering a mature period in 1950 owing to its extensive
application in telephony, developed explosively, not only because of its
mathematical challenge, but also because of the widespread occurrence of
queues in the life of modern society and therefore in the systems studied
by operations research workers; optimal control theory advanced in response
to operations research problems; value theory, since it deals with the key
issue for operations research of what importance to attach to various pos-
sibilities, was pushed forward vigorously; and game theory, which offered
a challenging framework for thought about operational problems and choices,
was pursued energetically.
However, operations research has also produced new theories offering
not only significant intellectual challenge but also important vistas of
potential application. The best known of these is, of course, linear
programming, which, like queuing theory, has developed explosively in the
three decades since the 1947 development of the simplex method by George
B. Dantzig (who received the US National Medal of Science in 1975 for his
work in this field); the important related fields of integer programming,
geometric programming, nonlinear programming, large-scale programming, and
stochastic programming have also been developed to considerable depth under
the pressure of need in applications. Owing to the important place that
the concept of decision assumed early 1n the history of operations research,
a theory of decision has emerged to deal with the attendant difficulties,
particularly those arising when multiple and competing criteria are present;
dynamic programming has been developed to deal with many kinds of sequential
decision problems; the theory of flows in networks contains a mature body
of knowledge that has undergirded a wide variety of applications; the
theory of simulation has played an important role for problems where analytic
theories are cumbersome or inaccessible, but where practical imperatives
push the analyst to results; and the art of heuristic problem solving is
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playing a growing role in handling problems of high computational complexity
(l3a) .
Arenas of Application
As operations research workers, armed with their methods (some old, but
also many new ones--including those just mentioned), have dealt with the
operations and problems of business, industry, and government, they have
observed many conceptual strands common to various operational processes.
Thus, they have assembled groups of methods and models appropriate to common
functional processes such as these: production planning, inventory control,
facilities location and layout, scheduling and sequencing, project planning
and control, reliability, maintenance and replacement, marketing, human
resource management, and forecasting (14).
These common functional processes occur ｾ ｮ many arenas of application
and methods and models can thus be widely applied. However, such arenas
also offer difficulties of their own for which analyses can inform decisions
about operations, policies, or plans. The Handbook of Operations Research
devotes chapters (15) to eight such arenas (urban services, health services,
educational processes, transportation systems, military systems, electric
utilities, the process industries, and the leisure industries), but the
list can easily be lengthened to include banking, advertising, university
administration, state and local government, federal government, highway safety,
communication-system management, agriculture, library and information-system
management, mining and the mineral industries, forestry and forest products,
and many more (16).
The concerns of business and industry--and of management generally--
bulk large in these lists, which accounts for why much of the work is carried
out and reported under the rubric of "management science." However, only a
stickler for fine detail would trouble to distinguish management science from
operations research by more than the practical context of the work (17).
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Lest the preceding discussion suggest that operations research can
flourish only in big institutional contexts, let us turn to an issue of
local governmental concern: a school-desegregation issue in a community
of modest size.
In 1954 the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that segregated
schools for black and white children were an unacceptable form of public
education and that schools should begin admitting students to schools
without racial discrimination "with all deliberate speed." A 1968 decision
had the effect of speeding up the process of desegregation, and, to this
end, it gave federal courts the authority to order busing school children
as one way of achieving the desired goal.
Any casual newspaper reader is aware of the storm of social and ethical
issues that arose from these landmark decisions. However, he may be unaware
that, at the root of the matter, there were two very practical difficulties
facing school boards and school officials:
• What precisely, in quantitative terms, does the court mean by deseg-
regation? Must every school have the same distribution by races as the
regional population? Or is there some maximum allowable variation? The
decisions did not deal directly with these questions, so the only course
open to a school jurisdiction was to devise a plan, calculate the resulting
school population distribution, and then submit it to the court to see
whether or not it would win approval •
• In devising and implementing such a plan, the practical difficulties
of school and bus assignments are formidable, particularly if, as is usually
the case, the numbers of schools and students are large, and if some rather
practical constraints (such as restricting the amount of additional travel
for students) are considered.
When the School Board of Alachua County, Florida (in which Gainesville
is located) faced these difficulties, they were able to obtain the assistance
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of Peter C. Belford and H. Donald Ratliff of the science faculty at the
University of Florida.
These two investigators approached the first of the two difficulties
in this way, as explained in a 1971 account of their work (18).
In order to get some feel for what the courts consider to be
"acceptable" desegregation plans, we contacted a number of organiza-
tions, including the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,
requesting any available information concerning desegregation plans
that had been submitted to the courts for approval. In every case
these organizations were either unable or unwilling to provide this
information. We were finally able to obtain from individual school
districts ten plans that had been accepted by the courts since 1967.
These plans were from school districts in Alabama, California,
Florida, and Georgia, and were approved by several courts.
Since the courts did not give reasons for accepting these plans,
an attempt was made to determine empirically from them some quantitative
measures of acceptability upon which future plans could be based. Two
measures that seemed reasonable were the maximum allowable deviation
from the actual percent black in a given district, and the average
allowable deviation from the actual percent black in a given district.
Since a number of the plans had at least one school that was almost
all white or almost all black, the maximum deviation provided little
information.
The available information on the allowable deviation for a given school
from the actual percent black in a given district showed figures as big as
34 percentage points for schools with more blacks than the district average
and 24 points for schools with fewer blacks than the average. However,
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it appeared, when the court decisions were viewed over time, that the allow-
able deviations from the district percentage of blacks were decreasing.
Therefore, the School Board of Alachua County, with this trend in mind,
decided arbitrarily to seek a plan that would keep the percent black within
five points on either side of the district percentage of 30 (in other words,
each school would be required to have between 25 and 35 percent blacks), a
decision that would yield an average deviation from 30 percent of somewhat
less than five points, a figure small enough to appear likely to gain court
approval.
With this constraint decided upon, the next step was to consider the
problem of assigning students to schools to meet the desired objective, plus
others that might be appropriate (such as keeping the additional distances
traveled by students down to acceptable levels).
To paraphrase the technical arguments of the analysts, they constructed
a model of the situation in this way: The school district under consideration
was divided into a fairly large number of student locations, each location
being considered to be where the students are who live in the immediately
surrounding area; this location may be thought of as the location of a school-
bus stop. For each location two sets of facts were known: the numbers of
white and black students, and the distances from the location to each available
school in the district. The distance considered was the distance that would
have to be traveled by a vehicle on streets to go from the location to the
school by the most direct route.
The decisions to be made using this starting point are how many white
and how many black students from each location to assign to each school
under these restrictions:
1. Each student is to be assigned to exactly one school.
2. Each school is to have assigned to it a number of students equal
to its capacity, which is known in advance.
3. The proportion of black students assigned to each school must lie
-16-
between 25 and 35 percent of its capacity.
In addition, some desirable features were added: No assignment would be
made that caused a student to be bused more than ten miles from home to school,
and no student who lived within two miles of an appropriate school would be
bused at all (that is, the student would walk to his nearest neighborhood
school).
Finally, a very important objective was introduced: to make the assign-
ment so as to minimize the total student-miles traveled.
Some transformations of this formulation allowed it to be recognized as
a ｭｩｮｩｭｵｾ｣ｯｳｴ flow problem in a single-commodity network, for which there is
not only adequate theory but also. several efficient methods of computation.
The analysts used this formulation
• • • to generate a desegregation plan for the school system
of Gainesville, Florida. The school district was divided into
one-quarter-square-mi1e blocks. Each block was considered as one
student location. The school board had previously compiled the
number of black students and the number of white students at each
of these locations as well as their current grade assignment •
The desired number of students in each school and the desired
bounds on the number of black and white students in each school
were provided by (the superintendent's office) • Each school
district was designated as either an elementary school (kinder-
garten through fifth grade), a middle school (sixth through eighth
grades), or a high school (ninth through twelfth grades). Each
system was then treated independently • • •
For the elementary-school system there were 6887 students (of whom
approximately 30 percent were black), 298 student locations, and 11 schools.
The computed results for this system were:
• Percent black: 25 (four cases), 29, 33, 34, 35 (four cases).
-17-
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Figure 3. Assignment of student locations to schools for the high
schools of Gainesville, Florida •
• Average number of miles traveled by the 2005 bused students (of whom
944 were white and 1061 black): 6 •
• Total number of student-bus miles: 11,628.
Similar results were obtained for the middle and high schools. Figure 3
shows how the student locations were assigned to the three high schools.
The desegregation plan generated by the model was used as the basis for
rezoning the schools in Gainesville; while some minor changes were made by
the school officials, the final districts put into operation were almost
indistinguishable from those derived by the computer (19).
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As quite often happens, this carefully defined and somewhat restricted
study shed some light on other issues, notably the concern of the public
that busing to achieve integration would involve students in long time-
consuming rides. However, a supplementary analysis showed this fear to be
largely without substance: A comparison of the desegregation assignment
with an optimal assignment of students to schools without regard to race
showed that the racially balanced assignment increased the student-bus-mi1es
by only 20, 6, and 7 percent for the elementary, middle, and high schools,
respectively. "The results indicate that the actual increase in busing is
much less, at least for the Gainesville system, than one might anticipate."
Systems Analysis
Since the brief account of the wartime work in operations research
showed how the work began in tactics but grew into planning and strategy,
it is natural to look for a similar pattern in postwar work. The two
examples we have sketched deal with tactical work, but must not be read
to suggest that only tactical work has been done. Rather the wartime
pattern has been followed: solid foundations in tactical understanding
have led to involvement in planning and strategy in many arenas (notably
in defense and large corporations, but with instances of successful involve-
ment in many other contexts as diverse as local government and university
management).
However, throughout this experience the analyst has had borne in on
him a fact of overriding importance: Each system he has worked on is merely
a subsystem in a larger system, indeed, one of an ever-widening congeries of
systems. Thus, just as the radar/fighter system was part of a larger warfare
system for the defense of England, the regional blood collection and distri-
bution system supports the hospitals of its region, which are a part of the
nation's health-care system; the school-busing system for Gainesville is a
supporting subsystem in the educational system for this city.
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Consequently, the purposes of the subsystems are subservient to the
purposes of the larger systems of which they are parts. For example, the
school-assignment study aimed to use the buses to achieve a rough equality
of the proportion of blacks in each school, the equal-proportion objective
being an expression of a goal of the social system in which the school
system was embedded. Similarly, the objectives the analysts adopted of
having the students within two miles of their schools walk there and of
limiting any bus ride to less than ten miles are quantitative interpreta-
tions of social goals perceived to be held by the community. Finally, it
is significant to note that, for the busing system to contribute to the
goals of the larger system of which it is a subsystem, it has to operate
somewhat "inefficiently," if we interpret efficiency as the subsystem
objective of getting the students to school with a minimum of travel.
Thus, the success of operations research workers in developing
scientific theories describing important classes of phenomena occurring
in man/machine operating systems and in using these models to solve prob-
lems arising in these systems has inevitably driven them to study larger
and larger systems: in other words, to what has come to be called "systems
analysis" (20).
But this imperative arises because it is intrinsic to the problems that
society has, and the ways they are embedded in large systems. For example:
our highway traffic system combines drivers and passengers, pedestrians, roads,
vehicles, the customs and rules of the road, the weather, the surrounding
environment, and the energy sources that make it work; our energy system
includes the sources from which we derive energy, the means for converting
these sources to usable forms, the distribution devices and procedures, the
using community (including the highway traffic system), the political and
international environment that affects energy deliveries and costs, and the
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natural and economic environment in which energy is used (and that is
affected by energy use); the analyst concerned with air quality must
study a system consisting, not only of the atmosphere and the natural
global and terrestrial features that affect its behavior, but also of
the patterns of human activity (including both transportation and energy
use generally) that contribute to the deterioration of air quality; and
so on. The familiar problems of highway safety, energy, and air quality
arise in the operations of these systems.
As the operations research analyst is driven toward considering the
operations of these larger systems, his classical partnership with the
operators of the smaller subsystems (the officers and men of the RAF
Fighter Command in the wartime example, the managers of the regional blood
centers and the hospital blood banks, the School Board and school administrators
of Gainesville) has to be extended to include, not only operating and
policy officials with much larger purviews, but also scientists with other
specialties relevant to the problems. For example, a comprehensive study
of an air-quality issue could demand not only operations research analysts
and meteorologists but also demographers, economists, statisticians, chemists,
energy-systems engineers, and regional planners--in addition to the
appropriate officials who should also participate in the work.
Thus, although historically systems analysis emerged largely from
the early operations research work, as it is conducted today it is
highly interdisciplinary. However, to reach its highest goals it must be
pandisciplinary in the sense of combining the contributions of the various
supporting disciplines into new syntheses--in other words, into new science
explaining the behavior of the large systems it is studying.
Since major systems analyses are nearly always closely associated
with major institutional policy decisions (21), the reports that describe
them often do not find their way into the archival literature of science.
Complete treatments are always too long for the usual journal article, and
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book-length treatment is somewhat deterred by the context of much of the
work. Nevertheless, a scattered literature is emerging, both to describe
case studies and to provide overviews of how such work is done (22).
From experience in the field as reported in this literature a sort of
central paradigm for systems analysis has become widely understood among
systems analysts. They expect a reasonably comprehensive systems analysis to:
• Marshal both the evidence relating to the problem and the scientific
knowledge bearing on it, when necessary, gathering new evidence and developing
new knowledge.
• Examine critically the social purposes--those of both persons and
institutions--relating to the problem.
• Explore alternative ways of achieving these purposes, often including
designing or inventing new possibilities.
• Reconsider the problem in the light of the knowledge accumulated during
the analysis.
• Estimate the impacts of various possible courses of action, taking into
consideration both the uncertain future and the organizational structures that
must carry these courses of action forward.
• Compare the alternatives by applying a variety of criteria to their
consequences.
• Present the results of the study to all concerned in a framework
suitable for choice.
• Assist in following through on the actions chosen.
• Evaluate the results of implementing the chosen courses of action.
However, because these steps are listed here in order, it would be a
mistake to infer that they take place in this order in a systems-analysis
study. Rather, there is almost always a great deal of recycling of ideas
and analysis; for ･ ｾ ｡ ｭ ｰ ｬ ･ Ｌ the impacts of the chosen courses of action may
dictate reconsidering the social purposes, the analysis of the chosen
alternatives may generate new and more interesting ones for consideration,
and so on. Nor do all systems analyses carry out all of the steps; the
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user may need only some of the steps carried out. Since the world does not
stand still while the work is going on, its changes may dictate major changes
in content and approach, or, since user representatives must work with the
analysis team throughout if the work 1S to be effective, early results may
get translated into action or policy quickly. All of these influences may
change the pattern of the work.
From a professional point of view, what sort of work does the systems
analyst do? We can expect him to: observe and describe the behavior of com-
plex systems; build models, where they are needed, to explain these observa-
tions, and test the extent of their validity for the purposes of his analysis;
use these models, in combination with other knowledge and constructs, to deduce
and synthesize descriptions of the behavior of important segments of the systems
under study; use technical ingenuity and design synthesis to devise programs
or courses of action; devise methods of generating comparisons of the alternative
courses of action; develop ways of communicating the results effectively, not
only to other systems analysts, but also to persons in a variety of other
communities of interest and responsibility; find ways of helping effectively
in the administrative activities of implementation; and devise procedures and
standards for evaluating the results of implemented courses of action. Through-
out the work, the analyst must be in close contact with his client.
In these lists of steps and activities in the systems-analysis process,
one can see much of the classical positivist view of science and its method,
but he can also see it greatly extended, this latter fact being very important
for the future growth and acceptance of systems analysis.
To summarize, the central goal of the systems analyst, based on his under-
standing of the systems he has been studying, isto bring his results to bear
on the functions of complex operating systems in society with a view to improving
them; he helps those with relevant interests and responsibilities to change these
functions beneficently. His analysis activities are aimed at assuring himself
and others, to the extent possible, that the changes will have desired results.
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However, he must pursue his purposes under important limitations and
difficulties:
• Even though the analyst may dream of considering a system so large
as to include within it all of the factors important to his problem, more
practical considerations force him to set reasonable boundaries so that
the work can be completed and reported on a schedule that will make its
findings effective. Whatever the scope of the system he studies, large or
small, it is a subsystem of a larger system, which creates difficulties at
the boundaries.
• The system he studies is tied to an ongoing process of some sort in
society that cannot be isolated for analysis, and therefore must be dealt
with in vivo, with many conflicting vested interests watching the analysis
and its results. Since this setting denies the analyst the privilege of
a secret burial of his mistakes, one of the hallmarks of systems analysis
today is a literature of strong criticism (23), good for the progress of
the field, but perhaps misleading in its net public impact.
• Further--and perhaps most unsettling from the current conservative
view of science and its role 1n society--he must work as part of the system
that his results may change.
What can be said, then of the current state of the science of man/
machine operating systems? It is well founded, active, and growing 1n S1ze
and importance (24). The cornerstone science of operations research has
advanced to a state of significant maturity, with its underlying theories
advancing, the scope and variety of problems it deals with expanding, and
the effectiveness of its findings growing in importance. However, systems
analysis, still in an earlier, more formative stage of development, faces
important, largely unsolved, difficulties:
1. The first is the very practical one of scale of effort and institu-
tional support. Clearly, if large-scale problems are to be tackled with interdis-
ciplinary teams, such teams must be available, and administrative arrangements must
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exist for them to work together closely, conditions that seldom exist today, even
in large US government bureaus (25). However, there is a notable exception
on the international scene that should be mentioned: the International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 1n Laxenburg, Austria, a nongovern-
mental research institute founded in 1972 and today supported by seventeen
countries from both East and West, brings together scientists from more
than twenty countries to conduct analyses on important international problems
(such as those of energy and food).
2. The second difficulty is access to problems and the information
bearing on them. To the worker in a classical science this may seem instinctively
surprising, until he recalls the number of institutions and administrations
involved with such problems as those of energy, and realizes that all have
information that may be relevant and that many may have to be influenced by the
systems analysis if the resul ts are to be effective. Unless there is cooperative
access and active participation in the work--sometimes forthcoming and sometimes
not--the systems analysis is handicapped, perhaps fatally.
3. The US science establishment's current widely held philosophy of
science--epitomized by the dichotomy "pure" and "applied"--is quite inadequate
for systems analysis, which quite clearly is inseparably both, in the best
traditions of science's long history.
4. The last difficulty is the lack of a code of good practice, widely
accepted by both the public and the conununity of science, to guide science's
attempts to influence public policy and to give the public a fair and
realistic concept of what to expect from science and systems analysis (26).
The Challenge of Systems Analysis
The urgency for developing systems analysis arises from the imperatives
of society's problems: they call for the sort of approach that systems
analysis represents. It is in the name of these urgent social problems
that systems analysis extends its challenge to all of science:
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• The problems to be addressed are some of the most important of our
age--and involve systems for which our thoroughly inadequate understanding
must be improved, an improvement to which all sciences will be called on
to contribute.
• The work of operations research analysts, even in the short history
of their subj ect, assures us that the difficulties to be overcome by systems
analysis are intrinsic and important, and will call forth the greatest
scientific ability and ingenuity; the result will be important new science
and significant applications.
• Since the goals and objectives of society and its subsystems are
essential ingredients in a systems analysis, as we have seen, the spokesmen
for these ideas (our literary men, political leaders, and philosophers) must
become involved, thus offering science the naturally created opportunity--
indeed, the obligation--of forming a ·union, not only of the sciences, but also
with the arts, in the common enterprise of improving the lot of mankind.
• The commonly accepted philosophy of science today must expand and
mature to encompass systems analysis activities as an expression of scientific
work. Leading thinkers in this field today (27) assure us that this is a
natural extension of the classical activities of science and its philosophy,
as well as a reasonable outgrowth of the philosophy of science as it has
been developed in recent years.
Many of the operations and systems analysis workers in the United States
gather at the semiannual joint meetings of the Operations Research Society
of America and The Institute of Management Sciences. In addressing one of
these meetings on October 16, 1979, Herbert A. Simon, who won the 1978 Nobel
Prize in economics, hailed it as "a celebration of human rationality." The
challenge to science and society is to enlarge this celebration to include
the rational management of all of society's systems and their problems.
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Figure Legends
Figure 1. Inventory levels and mean daily demands for blood units
for given availability rates at hospital blood banks.
Figure 2. Illustration of a planned regional blood flow.
Figure 3. Assignment of student locations to schools for the high
schools of Gainesville, Florida.
